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Abstract 
 Treating the EU through the civilian power prism and its civilisatory 
mission (la mission civilisatrice) is one of the oldest distinctive European 
concepts relating to its international political power, and consequently, of its 
nature as a security actor in the international relations. Conceptualization of 
the EU as a civilian power first makes the author François Duchêne, that 
interpreting the security and power structure of the European Union, its 
attributes (such as: weak diplomacy, incoherency, and total deficit of armed 
forces) and of course its nature as foedus pacificum (League of peace), can 
be concluded and its existence as a civilian actor, tending to achieve civilian 
objectives. In that sense, this paper describes and analyzes the nature of the 
EU identity as a civilian security actor on the international political scene. 
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Introduction 
Тhis paper is analysis of the essential features and elements of the 
civilian power Europe as a political and security concept. Namely, 
accompanied with the definition of the Union as a civilian power, is 
concluded and its essence as a foedus pacificum or the League of peace, as 
Immanuel Kant coined it in the book: Project for a Perpetual Peace (1795). 
Consequently, this formulation directly results from the pacifist orientation 
and determination of the Union as such, and its attitude towards the world, 
seeking to impose its pacifist and civilian vision on the international scene. 
Starting from the complexity and depth of this issue, this paper makes a short 
analysis of the ontological and epistemological manifestations of the 
presented phenomenon. In the text bellow, we will try to present the EU 
identity as an international civilian actor. 
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The EU’s Identity As An International Civilian Actor  
The European Union (EU; Union) possesses its own exclusive 
“personality contour” that drastically differentiate it from other international 
actors, of course regarding its civilisatory mission and its civilian profile as a 
international security actor. Therefore, do not need at all costs to talk about 
the “nationalization” or “etatization” of the EU, because the geopolitical, 
strategic and certainly the geo - economical conditions, in which the EU is 
born, grow and function, are radically different in relation to the states as 
major international security actors. Thus, the Union sketches its identity 
through its specificity, distinctiveness and separateness in relation to other 
security and political actors. On this basis, it can be concluded that the 
identity is not something static, or fixed and once given, but it is a dynamic 
process of (self) recognition, differentiation and establishment of a 
recognizable image of certain political community in the social environment. 
In this context, the politics of identity refers to a particular set of ideas about 
political community (Nicolaidis, 2004: 98), and values about the particular 
political community which are used to mobilize and to induce a state of 
cohesion and solidarity, in order to legitimize the international security and 
political identity of the particular actor. Thus, the cohesion as such is key 
element for building such international security and political identity of 
particular community or actor. Accordingly, the authors like Jupille and 
Caporaso noted four different dimensions of coherence, especially within the 
EU framework.  
The first dimension is called value cohesion, which basically has 
inclusive and integrative functions. Then, the second dimension is called 
tactical cohesion, which appears in terms of disharmony of the political 
attitudes of the member states, which use this “tactical” harmonization, for 
the fulfillment of their planned tasks and objectives. These authors also noted 
the procedural cohesion, which implies to a consensus in implementing the 
procedures for solving the “problematic” issues. Finally, as the fourth 
dimension, these authors noted the output cohesion, which directly refers to 
the situation where and when the member states of the Union, will fail to 
formulate a joint policy, regardless of the specific procedural rules. This type 
of cohesion directly implies the ability to articulate and formulate coherent 
and consistent foreign and security policy, which should provide a unique 
approach to the international relations of the Union as unique and unison 
international security actor. Analogously, the significance of this component 
within the EU emphasizes its inability to consistently formulate a cohesive 
and coherent foreign and security policy, because of different political and 
security views of its member states, in certain situations and under certain 
circumstances (e.g.: Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo etc.).  
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Namely, it is very important to underline that the Union must not and 
should not build its future on the nation - state concept, but it should 
continue to build itself on its genuine, distinct and civilian basis, which draw 
its legitimacy precisely from the postmodernism as its philosophical 
discourse. Regarding that, the postmodern political theory assumes several 
significant features, which are noted by the author Robert Cooper: 
1. Breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign 
affairs, 
2. Mutual interference in (traditional) domestic affairs and 
mutual surveillance,  
3. Rejection of force for resolving disputes and consequent 
codification of self-enforced rules of behavior 
4. Growing irrelevance of borders, come about both through the 
changing role of the state, but also through missiles, motor 
cars and satellites, and 
5. Security based on transparency, mutual openness, 
interdependence and mutual vulnerability (Cooper, 2002: 2). 
In favor of the EU distinctiveness and its postmodern identity as a 
civilian security actor, the theorist François Duchêne emphasized that: 
“Europe as a whole could well become the first example in history of a major 
centre of the balance of power (...) not a colonized victim but an exemplar of 
a new stage in political civilization” (Nicolaidis, 2004: 99). Even Romano 
Prodi, stressed the importance of the Union exemplarity and its successful 
model, when he said that the EU represent a “living example” which other 
international security actors undoubtedly should follow it. Also, the EU as 
civilian security actor assumes practicing the civilian power through the use 
of civilian assets in achieving civilian purposes and objectives, which 
directly derive from its ideological framework. Or as the author Laurent 
Cohen – Tanugi will highlight the EU pacifist orientation, describing it as a 
baggage of its ideological matrix: “multilateralism, global governance 
through law, and pacifism – Europe’s ideological baggage (…)” (Cohen – 
Tanugi, 2008: 88). Also, Hanns Maull further described the feature elements 
of the EU civilian power, which assumes certain characteristics closely 
related to the EU’s behavior and its international status as a cooperative 
international security civilian actor: 
1. The acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in 
the pursuit of international [security] objectives, 
2. The concentration on non - military, primarily economic, 
means to secure national goals, with military power left as a 
residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other 
means of international interaction, and 
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3. A willingness to develop supranational [security] structures to 
address critical issues of international management (Smith, 
2005: 2).  
Based on that, key issue which arises is the need for differentiation 
between the non - military vs. minimal military assets and of course their use 
in the civilian security aims within the context of EU international 
civilizatory mission. Also, K. J. Holsti offers several possible variants that 
represent the way of imposing influence by one international security actor 
through: “using persuasion (eliciting a favorable response without explicitly 
holding out the possibility of punishments); offering rewards; granting 
rewards; threatening punishment; inflicting non - violent punishment; or 
using force” (Smith, 2005: 4). Likewise, Prof. Christopher Hill emphasized 
some additional variants for imposing influence: “an actor can compel 
another actor to do something, using force (the stick) or deterrence (the 
threat of the use of force). Or it can sway another actor’s decisions, using 
persuasion (the carrot) and deference (latent influence)” (Smith, 2005). As 
far as the Union with its co - operative and co - optive nature, this variants of 
persuasion and cooperation for imposing its influence in the international 
relations, are definitely compatible with its existing normative infrastructure 
and its ideological matrix, which undoubtedly assumed the necessity for 
cooperation with others, concentration on non - military primarily economic 
assets for achieving the international security objectives and a willingness for 
developing a supranational security structures, as an effort embodied in its 
institution – building motive.  
The ideological framework of the EU, directly relates with its values, 
starting from its originality as post - war, pacifist, and postmodern actor. 
This is about those values that are directly and closely derived from the 
contemporary axiological constitution of the Western civilization, which 
modern civilization seems acceptable and desirable. Those are the following 
values: freedom, human rights, democracy, rule of law, individualism, civil 
society, pluralism, solidarity, protection of minorities, secularism, social - 
liberal economy, rationalism (as the greatest achievement of the 
Enlightenment) etc. Therefore, starting from the acceptability, progressivity, 
and the eternity of these value paradigms, it is constructed and the structure 
of the ideological matrix of the EU. Wheras, the main mechanism for EU 
operating as a civilian security actor in the international relations according 
to its ideological matrix, fundamentally can be articulated on three basic 
postulates: (co)operation, (co)optation and (co)ordination.  
Primarily, the EU can base its civilian security influence on two 
levels, both formally, through connecting, networking, or institutionalizing 
its security relations with other actors (e.g.: strengthening the EU dimension 
within NATO), and informally, through its model as virtuous exemplar, 
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where according to Romano Prodi, the Union represents a “living example” 
of success in achieving the peace. The informal level assumes emulation of 
the EU by the other international actors in the political and security aspect. 
But, as regards the formal aspects of practicing its security influence in the 
world, or the legitimizing and norming the cooperation with other actors, as 
an axiom of its specific, multi-facial and polyvalent international civilian 
power. Then, through co-opting, the EU accepts to be a part of a certain 
group of international actors, which acting mutually complement each other, 
thusly accomplishing together their anticipated security goals and objectives, 
thereby maximizing their gains by collaborating. As an example for this, 
should be mentioned the peacekeeping missions and operations, organized 
and implemented by multiple actors including the EU, where EU primarily 
appears as a civilian security actor. Such are the following missions: 
Operation ARTEMIS, EUPOL Proxima, EUPAT, EUJUST Themis, 
EUFOR, EUPOL Kinshasa, AMIS EU, UNAMID, EUFOR RD Congo, 
EUFOR Chad/RCA, MINURCAT, AMM, EUPM, EUFOR Althea, EULEX 
Kosovo, EUBAM, EUMM Georgia. These missions have already been 
completed. While the following are ongoing missions: EUSEC RD Congo, 
EUPOL RD Congo, EU SSR Guinea – Bissau, EUNAVFOR Somalia (later 
called: EU Naval Operation Atalanta), EUJUST LEX, EUPOL Afghanistan 
and EUPOL COPPS. 
Based on that, it can be concluded that the EU as a civilian security 
actor participate as an equal partner of the NATO and UN in implementing 
such peacekeeping (and police) missions worldwide, which undoubtedly 
strengthens the EU international identity and its security significance on the 
international scene. 
Whereas, as a third element appears the term coordination, which 
construed means: common organization, norming and pacification of mutual 
relations between the international actors on the global political scene in 
order to achieve some preferential goals and security objectives. Likewise, 
these three postulates, are also basic elements of the EU multilateral 
reasoning and acting in the international relations. 
Then, unlike the US doctrine of pre-emptive war and the “nation-
building”, the EU in parallel to its pre-emptive engagement, affirms the 
concept of “state-building” or “institution-building” as an institutional and 
structural instrument for harmonization and integration of divided, conflicted 
or post-conflict societies. Or as Mark Leonard emphasized: “The EU 
doctrine of pre-emption in contrast is predicated on a long-term involvement, 
with the military just one strand of activity, along with pre-emptive 
economic and legal intervention, and is aimed at building the political and 
institutional bases of stability, rather than simply removing the immediate 
source of threat” (Leonard, 2005: 63). In that context, the EU doctrine of pre-
European Scientific Journal November  2014 edition vol.10, No.32 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
299 
emptive engagement is European Security Strategy determination. 
Accordingly, as an example can be taken and the Balkans, where more than 
necessary was the creation of political structures, which possessed the 
strength to resist the ethnic nationalism, rather than to enhance it. Namely, 
“the core functions of state-building in Bosnia have been consciously 
designed to feed into the process of EU accession: building institutions, 
establishing the rule of law and economic reform, as well as encouraging 
refugees to return” (Leonard, 2005: 65). Namely, the urge to build 
institutions, emphasized in the aforementioned Maull’s typology, reflects the 
will of the EU to develop supranational security structures as a way to 
resolve critical issues and security infringements. Or as Jean Monnet stated: 
“Nothing is possible without men, nothing is lasting without institutions” 
(Ilik, 2009). In contrast, the absence of traditional armed forces of the EU (as 
regular means for imposing the influence through coercion and threat), 
regardless the installed EU battle groups and Rapid Reaction Forces within 
the Lisbon Treaty, does not represent a substantial deviation from the civilian 
nature of the EU and its identity as civilian security actor in the international 
relations. Within that, the author Stelios Stavridis emphasized: “Just because 
the EU has acquired military means does not invalidate the concept of 
civilian power EU. In fact, he contends that the EU must have military means 
in order to be a civilian power, because it is only by wielding military power 
that civilian ends can be pursued. Force can be necessary to promote human 
rights and democratic principles, and the EU should not hesitate to use it for 
those purposes” (Smith, 2005: 8). On this basis, it can be concluded that such 
situation is closely associated with the previous theoretical versions 
according to K. J. Holsti and Prof. Hill, in relation with their typology of 
imposing influence, which states that despite the violent (and non-violent) 
forms of coercion, there is also a form of persuasion, which directly implies 
effective diplomacy. Unlike the “bare” practicing of the power politics (the 
“stick”), which solely relies on military assets and potentials, using them as 
an identification for its diplomatic machinery (actually it's a problem with 
the growing power of China, and also the persistence of the “stubborn” 
unilateralism of the United States). Accordingly, such tendency for militarily 
legitimization of diplomacy is not relevant for the Union as such, because its 
security discourse is based on the values  generated through its ideological 
and all – inclusive ideological framework, constituted upon the norms 
stipulated in its constitutive treaties, which include only a civilian forms of 
international activities. That means that the EU does not have a legal and 
political capacity to legitimize its diplomacy on masculine and military 
propositions. But with the Lisbon Treaty, the EU installed, so called, 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (as a special contribution to the 
enhancement of its quasi-militarily operative capacity), which should be 
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understood as investing in the minimalist “hard power” segment, which 
directly arise from the need for dealing with a possible external military 
aggression against any of the EU member states (the principle of solidarity), 
and the fight against the global terrorism (as a paradigm of the international 
cooperation and co - optation), the prevention of potential conflicts and 
dealing with other natural and humanitarian disasters. According to the 
Lisbon Treaty stipulations, and the expansion of the Petersburg tasks, the 
Union will only gain legitimacy and an initial capacity to act in certain 
situations, such as: disarmament, humanitarian actions, and conflict 
prevention, which fall within the minimal military or military humanitarian 
activities of low rank, in order to achieve its civilian security goals and 
objectives. With such assets, the Union declines itself from the practice of 
aggression, and “obliges” itself that such low military assets will only use in 
the specific security and defense situations under the certain circumstances, 
just then, when the practice of such assets is conditioned by the specific 
civilian goals and objectives. Or as Kofi Annan has argued in the context of 
the Kosovo war: “that there are times when the use of force may be 
legitimate [only] in the pursuit of peace” (Hyde-Price, 2004: 15). Through 
this formulation, it can be concluded that the use of force by the Union must 
be an exception, while the use of law must be the rule. Therefore, the use of 
force should be reduced only under the specific circumstances with a 
previously specified tasks and above all, human and civilian purposes, as 
essential elements of the EU identity as a civilian security actor in the 
international relations. Thus the Union should contribute to the maximum 
reduction of the power politics worldwide and its logic in general, 
permanently trying to substitute it with a policy of cooperation as I stated 
before. But the use of force must be oriented only in order to preserve the EU 
as Foedus pacificum because as Robert Cooper stated: “The EU cannot 
protect its postmodern paradise much less spread its postmodern message if 
it is not prepared to play by the rules of the jungle outside it” (Smith, 2005: 
13). This kind of multilateral and pacifist psychology of the Union, was often 
contested and qualified as a sign of its weakness by the realist, not its 
potential power. In that regard, especially the “militant” and pro – realpolitik 
Americans, qualified the Union on several occasions, as an impotent, 
obstructionist, utopian and cynical. Or as Robert Kagan questioned: “Is 
Europe ready to oppose the knife with a knife?” (Kagan, 2002). Also, Kagan 
described the modern European strategic culture as a: “conscious rejection 
of the European past, a rejection of the evils of European machtpolitik. It is a 
reflection of Europeans’ ardent and understandable desire never to return to 
that past. Who knows better than Europeans the dangers that arise from 
unbridled power politics, from an excessive reliance on military force, from 
policies produced by national egoism and ambition, even from balance of 
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power and raison d’état?” (Kagan, 2008). In that sense, the new Europe 
spawned from the “gun barrels” had already started to build itself on some 
totally different, unconventional basis, which actually represent an 
axiological, normative, ethical and antimilitaristic construction, designed for 
totally pacification of the European continent (and the world), and 
progressing towards the protection, maintenance and achievement of a 
perpetual peace within the Europe, and the world as a whole. Accordingly, 
when discussing the Union as a civilian security actor in the international 
relations, should be noted the specificity of its strategic culture, which in its 
essence is highly pacifist - oriented, fully accepting the postulates of peaceful 
resolution of the conflicts, notorious affirmation of the culture of prevention 
versus the culture of repression, and the use of diplomacy instead of armed 
forces in the processes of solving the security issues.  
 
Conclusion 
The civilian power Europe certainly is sympathetic and basically 
utopist concept of international relations, regarding the actual and realpolitik 
constellations of global political power. But, if the EU wants to identify itself 
as a relevant international civilian actor, with highly efficient dynamic, it 
must slowly to transform its civilian power assets. Mainly, it refers to the 
transformation of its power perception and acceptance of the “smart power” 
concept, which represents a deliberative combination of both concepts, the 
soft and hard power concepts, which assumes structured investment in the 
military capacities, legitimized with the Lisbon Treaty provisions for the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defense Agency. The 
EU must not abuse them in aggressive and oppressive way, but to use them 
in direction of establishing a political stability and stability in particular 
region, where the need arise for security intervention by the Union, of course 
in coordination with the NATO and UN. This kind of (low) “militarization” 
of the Union, is categorized as a “civilian power plus”. Or as the former EU 
High Representative, Baroness Catherine M. Ashton stressed: “We must 
mobilize all our levers of influence - political, economic, plus civil and 
military crisis - management tools - in support of a single political strategy 
(…) At the same time, the EU should work to strengthen cooperation with 
world powers such as the US and Russia, and rising powers such as China 
and India (...) in a world of deep interdependence where threats are global, 
everybody needs partners” (Andreas, 2010). The EU need adapt itself to the 
reality and to learn how to make a junction between the civilian and military 
assets, but also to formulate an adequate military mechanism that will use it 
when the law starts to lose the battle against the force. In that sense, the 
strengthening of internal and external coherence and low militarization of the 
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EU system, provided by the Lisbon Treaty, will enable the EU to act as a 
single and smart international civilian security actor, with full operative 
capacity on the international political scene, aiming to fulfill its civilizatory 
mission. 
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